Using Cost Observation to Regulate Bureaucratic Firms by João Correia-da-Silva & Ana P. Borges
	
		
		 
	

  	
!     
	
	

"
# $ 
	

%&'( ) %*''+
Using Cost Observation to Regulate Bureaucratic Firms?
Ana Pinto Borges
Faculdade de Economia. Universidade do Porto. PORTUGAL.
Joa˜o Correia-da-Silva
CEMPRE and Faculdade de Economia. Universidade do Porto. PORTUGAL.
December 2nd, 2008
Abstract. We study regulation of a bureaucratic provider of a public good in the
presence of moral hazard and adverse selection. By bureaucratic we mean that it
values output in itself, and not only profit. Three different financing systems are
studied: cost reimbursement, prospective payment, and the optimal contract. In all
cases, the output level increases with the bureaucratic bias. We find that the optimal
contract is linear in cost (fixed payment plus partial cost-reimbursement). A stronger
preference for high output reduces the tendency of the firm to announce a high cost
(adverse selection), allowing a more powered incentive scheme (a lower fraction of the
costs is reimbursed), which alleviates the problem of moral hazard.
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1 Introduction
The regulation of a public firm under asymmetric cost information has been the
subject of intensive research since the pioneering papers of Baron and Myerson (1982),
Baron and Besanko (1984) and Laffont and Tirole (1986). In this literature, it is
assumed that the managers of the firms maximize profit net of the disutility of effort.
This is a quite restrictive assumption, since managers are known to be interested not
only in monetary rewards but also in managing a large firm. This preference may
reflect the concern of the managers with their reputation and career.
The possibility of bureaucratic behavior should be taken into account when designing
a financing system. The public bureau or public firm is characterized by weak external
control on efficiency and weak internal incentives (Mueller, 2003). The goals of the
bureaucrat are “salary, perquisites of the office, public reputation, power, patronage,
output of the bureau, ease of making changes, and ease in managing the bureau”
(Niskanen, 1971).1 This motivates us to study procurement contracts between the
government and a bureaucratic manager, and to examine whether this changes the
results previously obtained in the literature.
In the theory of regulation and procurement, it is usual to assume that the firm (agent)
is better informed about its cost than the regulator (principal). This is common to the
contributions of Baron and Myerson (1982), Baron and Besanko (1984) and Laffont
and Tirole (1986, 1993), which were important milestones. In the work of Baron and
Myerson (1982), cost is unobservable. Therefore, the gross payment to the firm can
only be a function of the cost function announced by the firm (prospective payment).
In this context, the firm tends to announce a high marginal cost in order to receive a
high payment while incurring in a low cost. The procurement contract should provide
incentives for the firm to announce its true cost (rewarding the firm for announcing a
low cost). In the setup of Baron and Besanko (1984), the regulator can, ex post, pay
an auditing cost to observe (imperfectly) the firm’s cost. The optimal scheme is to
audit the firm when the reported cost is above a particular level and impose a penalty
when the observed cost is low.
To this context of regulation under adverse selection, Laffont and Tirole (1986) add
the problem of moral hazard. While in the models of Baron and Myerson (1982) and
1For a discussion of the motivation of bureaucrats in a public organization, see Wilson (1989,
chapter 9).
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Baron and Besanko (1984) the firm’s only decision variable is the announcement of its
marginal cost (adverse selection), in the model of Laffont and Tirole (1986), the firm’s
cost-reducing effort (unobserved by the government) is also a decision variable (adverse
selection and moral hazard). Under moral hazard, the planner cannot penalize low
observed costs as in the work of Baron and Besanko (1984). The firm would simply
reduce its effort to increase cost. The optimal contract is shown to be linear in
observed cost, being composed by a fixed payment plus a partial cost reimbursement.
The fraction of realized cost that is reimbursed to the firm increases with the firm’s
announced cost (while the output decreases with the firm’s announced cost).2
In this paper, we allow the manager of the firm to have a preference for higher output,
deriving utility from the difference between the output level of the firm and a “refer-
ence output level”. We study three different kinds of procurement contracts between
a bureaucratic firm and a government: a cost reimbursement system, which consists
of compensating the firm for the costs in which it incurs, a prospective payment sys-
tem, which grants a fixed financing, independently of the costs that the firm comes
to incur, and the optimal incentive scheme.
In all cases, we show that the output level, as one could expect, is increasing with the
bureaucratic bias (strength of the preference for higher output). Since the cost sav-
ings associated with effort are proportional to the output, the effort level is increasing
with the output level, and, therefore, with the bureaucratic bias (except in the case
of the cost reimbursement system, in which cost-reducing efforts are not available).
Generalizing the analysis of Laffont and Tirole (1986) to allow for bureaucratic be-
havior, we find that the optimal contract depends on the strength of the preference
of the firm for higher output, but remains linear in cost (is still composed by a fixed
prospective transfer plus a partial reimbursement). A stronger preference for high
output reduces the tendency of the firm to announce a high cost (adverse selection),
allowing a more powered incentive scheme (a lower fraction of the costs is reimbursed),
alleviating the problem of moral hazard. In all the cases under study, the expected
social welfare increases (decreases) with the bureaucratic bias whenever the expected
2Laffont and Tirole (1986) compare their setting with the case in which the regulator is unable
to observe cost (as in Baron and Myerson, 1982). If the cost is unobservable, the optimal regulatory
policy is a gross transfer that depends on the firm’s cost report (prospective payment) in such a way
that the firm has no incentive to misrepresent its costs. The prospective payment implies no effort
distortion for a given output level contrary to the optimal incentive contract with cost observability,
in which the effort is lower than optimal.
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output is larger (lower) than the reference output level. This suggests that it is better
(from the regulator’s point of view) to hire a more bureaucratic manager in order to
run a large firm and a less bureaucratic manager in order to run a small firm.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and section 3 analyzes
the benchmark case of complete information. In sections 4, 5 and 6, we derive the
different procurement contracts: optimal incentive scheme, cost reimbursement and
prospective payment, respectively. Finally, Section 7 offers some concluding remarks.
2 The model
We consider a model of procurement in which the government (principal) offers a
contract to the firm (agent) for the provision of a public good. The firm produces an
observable output, q, incurring in an observable total cost:
C = (βˆ − e)q + .
The intrinsic cost parameter, βˆ, is drawn from a uniform distribution
[
β, β
]
and is
firm’s private information (adverse selection). The effort level chosen by the firm after
the contract is signed, e ≥ 0, is also unobservable (moral hazard). Cost observation
is subject to an error, , a random variable with zero mean.3
The government observes the total cost, C, incurred by the firm and pays in addition
a net monetary transfer t.
The social value of output is S(q), with marginal social value being strictly positive
and decreasing, S ′(q) > 0 and S ′′(q) < 0, for any q ∈ [0, q). We also set S(0) = 0 and
S ′(q) = 0 (where q can be interpreted as full coverage of the needs of the population).
The ex ante utility level of the firm is
U = αE(t) + δ(q − qref )− ψ(e), (1)
where E(t) is the expected value of the net monetary transfer, qref is the output
reference level of the bureaucrat, and α and δ ≥ 0 are weight factors that measure the
3This random variable may also be interpreted as a cost disturbance that is unknown to the firm
when it chooses its effort level.
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biases of the bureaucrat toward profit and output, respectively. Finally, ψ(e), stands
for the disutility of effort, with ψ′(e) > 0, ψ′′(e) > 0 and ψ′′′(e) ≥ 0.
The government finances the public good provision using a distortionary mechanism
(taxes, for example) so that the social cost of raising one unit is 1 +λ. The welfare of
consumers is the social value of the public good less the cost of providing it, S(q) −
(1+λ)E(t+C). The government seeks to maximize the sum of the consumer’s welfare
with the utility of the firm.
3 The case of complete information
As a benchmark case, we start by considering that the government is able to observe
the marginal cost parameter, βˆ, as well as the level of effort, e. The problem of the
government is:
max
q,e,t
{S(q)− (1 + λ)E(t+ C) + U} (2)
subject to
U ≥ 0.
Using (1), it can be written as:
max
q,e,U
{
S(q)− 1 + λ
α
[
U − δ(q − qref ) + ψ(e) + α(βˆ − e)q
]
+ U
}
(3)
subject to
U ≥ 0.
It is necessary that λ > α− 1 for the participation constraint to be binding (U = 0).
Otherwise, we could always improve welfare by increasing the taxes and the payment
to the firm.4
The first order conditions of problem (3) are:
S ′(q) = (1 + λ)
(
βˆ − e− δ
α
)
, (4)
ψ′(e) = αq. (5)
4This is in the same spirit as the usual assumption of λ > 0 (Laffont and Tirole, 1986).
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The second order conditions of problem (3) are:5
S ′′(q) < 0,
ψ′′(e) > 0,
S ′′(q)ψ′′(e) + α(1 + λ) < 0.
We make the following assumptions for the problem to be well-behaved.
Assumption 1.
(i) 1 + λ > α;
(ii) ∀q ∈ [0, 1], S ′′(q)ψ′′(0) < −α(1 + λ);
(iii) S ′(0) > (1 + λ)(β − δ/α);
(iv) ψ′(β − δ/α) > αq.
Together with ψ′′′ ≥ 0, assumption (ii) guarantees that the second order conditions
are always satisfied. Assumption (iii) ensures a positive output level. Assumption
(iv) ensures that the marginal cost is positive.
For illustrative purposes, we shall often refer to the case where S(q) = 2q − q2,
ψ(e) = e2/2, λ = 0.1, α = 1, δ = 0.05 or δ = 0, β = 1.1, β = 1.3 and qref = 1.
From (4) and (5), we obtain (see Appendix A):
q∗c =
1
2− α(1 + λ)
[
2− (1 + λ)
(
βˆ − δ
α
)]
,
e∗c = αq
∗
c ,
t∗c =
δ
α
(qref − q∗c ) +
e∗c2
2α
.
The optimal output, q∗c , and the level of effort, e
∗
c , are decreasing functions of the
intrinsic marginal cost, βˆ, and increasing functions of the bureaucratic bias toward
higher output, δ. The bureaucratic behaviour reduces social welfare. This occurs
because we have chosen a reference output that is higher than the expected output,
aggravating the participation constraint.
5Corresponding to ∂
2f
∂q2 < 0,
∂2f
∂e2 < 0 and
∂2f
∂q2
∂2f
∂e2 <
(
∂2f
∂q∂e
)2
.
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Figure 1: Output with (δ = 0.05) and
without bureaucracy (δ = 0).
Figure 2: Social welfare with (δ = 0.05)
and without bureaucracy (δ = 0).
4 The optimal incentive scheme
In this section, we consider the case in which the government is able to observe the
output level, q, and the total cost, C, but not the marginal cost of the firm, βˆ, nor
the effort made by the firm, e.6
Thanks to the Revelation Principle7, we can restrict (without loss of generality) our
attention to incentive compatible direct mechanisms.
The government offers a contract to the firm, specifying an output, q(β), and a com-
pensation scheme, t(β, C), which depend on the intrinsic marginal cost announced
by the firm, β. Given the compensation scheme, the bureaucrat chooses the level
of effort, e, that maximizes its utility. The contract should be incentive compatible
(induce truthful revelation):
βˆ ∈ arg max
β∈[β,β]
U(β, βˆ),
where U(β, βˆ) denotes the utility attainable by a firm with cost βˆ that announces a
6Before the contract is signed, the government knows the objective function of the firm, and the
prior probability distribution of the efficiency parameter, βˆ (uniform on the interval
[
β, β
]
).
7By the revelation principle (Myerson, 1979), given a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of a game of
incomplete information, there exists a direct mechanism that has an equivalent equilibrium where
the players truthfully report their types. A direct-revelation mechanism is said to be “incentive
compatible” if, when each individual is expecting the others to be truthful, then he/she has interest
in being truthful.
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cost β.
The net monetary transfer depends on the announced efficiency and on the observed
cost. The expected net monetary transfer (with respect to the disturbance term ) is:
s(β) = E
{
t
[
β, C(βˆ, e, q, )
]}
= E
{
t
[
β, (βˆ − e)q + 
]}
.
4.1 The firm’s optimization problem
We start by analyzing the case in which there is no cost disturbance ( = 0).
The firm announces its marginal cost, β, and the government recommends a level of
effort, e(β). Truthful behavior implies that a cost (observed by the government) given
by C(β) = [β − e(β)]q(β).
With perfect cost observation ( = 0), the observed cost must be exactly equal to
C(β). Otherwise, the government would impose an extreme penalty to the firm:
C 6= C(β) ⇒ t(β, C) = −∞.
Still, a firm with cost βˆ can claim to have a higher cost, β > βˆ, and choose a lower
level of effort, e(β, βˆ), incurring in a cost C = [βˆ − e(β, βˆ)]q(β). The firm’s deviation
is concealed if and only if the firm makes an effort, e(β, βˆ), that is such that:
C = C(β) ⇔ e(β, βˆ) = e(β) + βˆ − β.
For any true efficiency parameter of the firm, βˆ, truth-telling must maximize the
utility of the firm (incentive compatibility condition):
βˆ ∈ arg max
β∈[β,β]
{
αs(β) + δ [q(β)− qref ]− ψ
[
e(β) + βˆ − β
]}
. (6)
Let V (βˆ) be the value function of the maximization problem:
V (βˆ) = max
β∈[β,β]
U(β, βˆ) = max
β∈[β,β]
{
αs(β) + δ [q(β)− qref ]− ψ
[
e(β) + βˆ − β
]}
.
Since the incentive compatibility condition (6) must be satisfied, the value function
becomes:
V (βˆ) = αs(βˆ) + δ
[
q(βˆ)− qref
]
− ψ
[
e(βˆ)
]
. (7)
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From the Envelope Theorem8, we obtain the first order incentive compatibility con-
straint:
V ′(βˆ) = −ψ′
[
e(βˆ)
]
. (8)
Incentive compatibility implies equation (8), which tells us that the derivative of the
value function is equal to the symmetric of the marginal disutility of equilibrium effort.
More efficient firms obtain higher equilibrium utility.
Integrating, we obtain:
V (βˆ) = V (β) +
∫ β
βˆ
ψ′ [e(γ)] dγ. (9)
The local second order condition, ∂
2U(β,βˆ)
∂β2
≤ 0, can be written using the first order
condition, ∂U(β,βˆ)
∂β
= 0, and ψ′′ > 0. It becomes (see Appendix B.1):
e′(βˆ) ≤ 1. (10)
Which means that the actual marginal cost, βˆ − e, is increasing with the intrinsic
marginal cost, βˆ.
Proposition 1 (Firm’s optimization problem).
If deviations in the firm’s concealment set are not profitable, then:
(i) the effort function and the utility function are differentiable almost everywhere;
(ii) the first order incentive compatibility constraint is given by (8);
(iii) this necessary condition is also sufficient if the effort function satisfies (10).
Proof. See Appendixes B.2 and B.3.
8See, for example, Chiang and Wainwright (2005).
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4.2 The government’s optimization problem
The objective of the government is to maximize expected social welfare:
max
q(βˆ),e(βˆ),t(βˆ)
E
∫ β
β
S
[
q(βˆ)
]
− (1 + λ)
[
t(βˆ) + C(βˆ)
]
+ V (βˆ) dβˆ (11)
subject to, for all βˆ,
V (βˆ) ≥ 0, (12)
V ′(βˆ) = −ψ′
[
e(βˆ)
]
. (8)
e′(βˆ) ≤ 1, (10)
From equation (8), V is a decreasing function of βˆ, so (12) is satisfied if and only if
V (β) ≥ 0. Therefore, we can replace (12) by V (β) = 0.
We start by studying a relaxed problem in which the second order incentive compati-
bility condition (10) is ignored. We shall check later that the solution of this relaxed
problem is the solution of the general problem.
The relaxed problem of the government is the following:
max
q(βˆ),e(βˆ),V (βˆ)
∫ β
β
S
[
q(βˆ)
]
− 1 + λ
α
{
V (βˆ)− δ
[
q(βˆ)− qref
]
+ ψ
[
e(βˆ)
]}
−
−(1 + λ)
[
βˆ − e(βˆ)
]
q(βˆ) + V (βˆ) dβˆ (13)
subject to
V (β) = 0, (14)
V ′(βˆ) = −ψ′
[
e(βˆ)
]
. (8)
This is an optimal control problem with state variable V (βˆ) and control variables e(βˆ)
and q(βˆ). The first order conditions, written below, are obtained in Appendix B.4.
Proposition 2 (Government’s optimization problem - necessary conditions).
The following are necessary conditions for an interior optimum of problem (13):
V (β) = 0, (14)
V ′(βˆ) = −ψ′
[
e(βˆ)
]
, (8)
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S ′
[
q(βˆ)
]
= (1 + λ)
[
βˆ − e(βˆ)− δ
α
]
, (15)
ψ′
[
e(βˆ)
]
= αq(βˆ)−
(
1− α
1 + λ
)
(βˆ − β)ψ′′
[
e(βˆ)
]
. (16)
This problem (13) has a unique interior optimum (see Appendix B.4).
We need to check that the condition which was omitted in the relaxed problem (e′(βˆ) ≤
1) is satisfied. Differentiating equations (15) and (16), we obtain:{
S ′′q∗
′
= (1 + λ)(1− e∗′)
ψ′′e∗
′
= αq∗
′ − (1− α
1+λ
) [
ψ′′ + (βˆ − β)ψ′′′e∗′
] ⇔
⇔
 q
∗′ = 1+λ
S′′ (1− e∗
′
)
e∗
′
=
α(1+λ)−(1− α1+λ)S′′ψ′′
S′′ψ′′+α(1+λ)+(1− α1+λ)(βˆ−β)S′′ψ′′′
Using Assumption 1 (i) and (ii), we find that e∗
′
< 0 and q∗
′
< 0, which implies that
(10) is verified. The solution of (13) is also the solution of (11).
Observe that the more efficient is the firm, the higher are the output and the effort.
Proposition 3.
Under Assumption 1, the firm’s effort increases with its efficiency. Therefore, the
firm’s second order condition is satisfied, and the solution of the relaxed problem (13)
is the solution of the general problem (11).
The equilibrium transfer is such that:
αt∗(βˆ) = V (βˆ)− δ
[
q∗(βˆ)− qref
]
+ ψ
[
e∗(βˆ)
]
.
Using (9), we obtain:
t∗(βˆ) =
1
α
{∫ β
βˆ
ψ′ [e∗(γ)] dγ − δ
[
q∗(βˆ)− qref
]
+ ψ
[
e∗(βˆ)
]}
.
We find that the effort and the output levels are increasing on the manager’s marginal
utility of output, δ (see Appendix B.6, Lemma 7). The intuition behind these results
is that an increase in the δ gives more weight to the output level in the firm’s objective
function and, hence, also in the social welfare function. This translates into higher
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output and higher effort levels, the later because the cost savings associated with the
effort are proportional to the output level.
With the social value given by S(q) = 2q − q2 and the disutility of effort given by
ψ(e) = e2/2 (with parameter values that satisfy Assumption 1), equations (15) and
(16) allow us to determine the levels of output, effort and transfer (see Appendix B.4):
q∗(βˆ) =
2
2− α(1 + λ) −
1 + λ
2− α(1 + λ)
[
βˆ − δ
α
+
(
1− α
1 + λ
)
(βˆ − β)
]
,
e∗(βˆ) = αq∗(βˆ)−
(
1− α
1 + λ
)
(βˆ − β),
t∗(βˆ) =
1
α
{∫ β
βˆ
e∗(γ)dγ − δ
[
q∗(βˆ)− qref
]
+
e∗(βˆ)2
2
}
.
Figure 3: Output with (δ = 0.05) and
without bureaucracy (δ = 0).
Figure 4: Social welfare with (δ = 0.05)
and without bureaucracy (δ = 0).
In this example, the bureaucratic bias reduces social welfare. This occurs because
the reference output is higher than the expected output, implying an increase of the
monetary transfer from the government to the firm (for the participation constraint
to be satisfied).
In general, we find that an increase in the value of δ increases (reduces) expected
social welfare if the expected output level is larger (lower) than the reference output
(see Appendix B.6, Lemma 8). This means that, when the reference output is lower
than expected output, a manager who is more “bureaucratic” is less costly to society
as a whole, because the manager receives in a non-monetary form a larger part of the
informational rent V . The opposite occurs when the reference output is higher than
expected output.
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4.3 Implementation
We now consider the implementation problem. Let
{
e∗(βˆ), q∗(βˆ), V (βˆ)
}
denote the
solution to (13), and let t∗(βˆ), C∗(βˆ) and C(βˆ, e, q, ) denote the corresponding ex-
pected transfer, expected cost and observed cost.
When there is no disturbance,  = 0, to implement the solution, it suffices for the
government to: (i) ask the firm to announce its marginal cost, β; (ii) choose output
q∗(β); and (iii) give transfer t∗(β) if C = C∗(β), and −∞ otherwise. Laffont and
Tirole (1986) defined this contract as the “knife-edge” mechanism.
However, the “knife-edge” mechanism does not work if the cost is not perfectly ob-
served. If there is any noise, the probability of incurring in an extreme penalty
becomes positive and makes the firm unwilling to participate.
To implement the optimal solution in the more general case of cost disturbance, we
must find a transfer function t(β, C) that is such that:[
βˆ, e∗(βˆ)
]
∈ argmax
{
αE
[
t
(
β, (βˆ − e)q(β) + 
)]
+ δ [q(β)− qref ]− ψ(e)
}
and
E
{
t
[
βˆ,
[
βˆ − e∗(βˆ)
]
q∗(βˆ) + 
]}
= t∗(βˆ).
Consider the following transfer function (linear in observed cost):
t(β, C) = t∗(β) +K∗(β) [C∗(β)− C] ,
where
K∗(β) =
ψ′ [e∗(β)]
αq∗(β)
. (17)
If the observed cost is higher than expected cost, C > C∗(β), the government reim-
burses a fraction of the difference, 1−K∗(β), while the firm supports the remaining
fraction, K∗(β).
A firm with intrinsic cost βˆ solves:
max
β,e
αt∗(β) + αE {K∗(β) [C∗(β)− C]}+ δ [q∗(β)− qref ]− ψ(e). (18)
Notice that:
K∗(β) [C∗(β)− C] = ψ
′[e∗(β)]
α
[
e− e∗(β) + β − βˆ − 
q∗(β)
]
.
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Substituting in (18), we obtain:
max
β,e
αt∗(β) + ψ′[e∗(β)]
[
e− e∗(β) + β − βˆ
]
+ δ [q∗(β)− qref ]− ψ(e). (19)
Optimization with respect to e yields:
ψ′ [e∗(β)] = ψ′(e)⇔ e = e∗(β).
Substituting again, problem (19) simplifies:
max
β
αt∗(β) + ψ′[e∗(β)]
(
β − βˆ
)
+ δ [q∗(β)− qref ]− ψ [e∗(β)] .
Optimizing with respect to β:
αt∗
′
(β) + ψ′′ [e∗(β)] e∗
′
(β)(β − βˆ) + ψ′ [e∗(β)] + δq∗′(β)− ψ′ [e∗(β)] e∗′(β) = 0.
Substituting β = βˆ we obtain:
αt∗
′
(βˆ) + ψ′
[
e∗(βˆ)
] [
1− e∗′(βˆ)
]
+ δq∗
′
(βˆ) = 0.
Which we know that is true as it coincides with the first order incentive compatibility
condition (8).
Notice that the firm’s second order condition for (19) is satisfied, as it boils down to:
e∗
′
(β) ≤ 0. (20)
We draw the following conclusion.
Proposition 4.
Under Assumption 1, the optimal incentive compatible allocation, [q∗(βˆ), e∗(βˆ), t∗(βˆ)],
can be implemented by a contract that is linear in observed cost:
t(β, C) = t∗(β) +K∗(β) [C∗(β)− C] .
The second order condition (20) is stronger than (10). It is necessary for this way of
implementing the optimal solution, which requires the transfer to be linear in cost.
If (20) is satisfied (as is the case under our assumptions), then the linear scheme
implements the optimal solution.
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The linear scheme implements the optimal allocation. Furthermore, it has a very ap-
pealing property. Notice that the optimal allocation is independent of the distribution
of cost uncertainty. The linear scheme is the only scheme that implements the optimal
allocation for any probability distribution of the cost disturbance (see Appendix B.5).
Let us now turn to the effect of a variation of δ on the “power” of the incentive
scheme, that is, on the fraction of the cost that is supported by the firm, K∗. We
find that K∗ is increasing in δ for any value of βˆ (if ψ′′′ is small enough). A more
bureaucratic firm leads to more powered incentive schemes (this proposition is made
precise in Appendix B.6, Lemma 9).
5 The reimbursement payment system
In this section, we consider the case in which there is no cost-reducing effort (the cost
function is C = βˆq+), and study the financing system known as cost-reimbursement,
which consists in: (i) compensating the firm for all the costs which it incurs; plus (ii)
a net payment in advance, t(βˆ), which can be negative because a bureaucratic firm
enjoys producing a high output.
The bureaucratic bias, δ, leads to a significant difference with respect to the usual
reimbursement payment (Laffont and Tirole, 1993): the equilibrium transfer to the
firm depends on the intrinsic marginal cost.
The utility of the firm is U = αt(β)+ δ [q(β)− qref ]. It is independent of βˆ, therefore,
it must be constant across β for the firm to be truth-telling. Therefore, the government
will choose t(β) and q(β) such that U(β) = 0, for any announcement β (notice that the
participation constraint is binding for α < 1+λ, which is the economically interesting
case).
To produce an output lower than qref , the firm requires a positive net transfer to
participate, t(βˆ) > 0. If the output is higher than qref , the firm accepts a negative
transfer, t(βˆ) < 0.9
U(βˆ) = 0⇔ t(βˆ) = − δ
α
[
q(βˆ)− qref
]
. (21)
9This has the flavor of the typical agency problem in which the managers value output while the
owners value profits.
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The government’s problem is:
max
q(βˆ),t(βˆ)
∫ β
β
S
[
q(βˆ)
]
− (1 + λ)
[
C(βˆ) + t(βˆ)
]
+ αt(βˆ) + δ
[
q(βˆ)− qref
]
dβˆ (22)
subject to
t(βˆ) = − δ
α
[
q(βˆ)− qref
]
. (21)
Equivalently:
max
q(βˆ)
∫ β
β
S
[
q(βˆ)
]
− (1 + λ)
{
βˆq(βˆ)− δ
α
[
q(βˆ)− qref
]}
dβˆ. (23)
The first order condition of problem (23) is:
S ′
[
q(βˆ)
]
= (1 + λ)
(
βˆ − δ
α
)
.
The second order condition is verified because S ′′(q) < 0.
Appendix C studies the problem (23) with S(q) = 2q(βˆ)− q(βˆ)2. The solution is:
q∗r(βˆ) = 1−
1 + λ
2
(
βˆ − δ
α
)
,
t∗r(βˆ) = −
δ
α
[
1− 1 + λ
2
(
βˆ − δ
α
)
− qref
]
.
Figure 5: Output with (δ = 0.05) and
without bureaucracy (δ = 0).
Figure 6: Social welfare with (δ = 0.05)
and without bureaucracy (δ = 0).
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With bureaucratic behavior, the cost reimbursement system yields a net transfer that
is different from zero, a higher output and a decrease in social welfare. When compared
with the optimum incentive scheme, we observe a lower level of output. It is easy to see
that, as in the case of the optimal incentive scheme, expected social welfare increases
(decreases) with the bureaucratic bias whenever the expected output level is higher
(lower) than the reference output.
6 The prospective payment system
The prospective payment system consists of a fixed payment, g(β), independent of
the observed cost.10
The net monetary transfer is t
[
β, C(βˆ, e, q, )
]
= g(β)− C(βˆ, e, q, ).
6.1 The firm’s optimization problem
The firm chooses the values of β and e that maximize expected utility:
U(β, βˆ) = max
e
αg(β)− α(βˆ − e)q(β) + δ [q(β)− qref ]− ψ(e).
The first order condition with respect to e determines the level of effort:
ψ′ [e(β)] = αq(β). (24)
Since the government’s transfer does not depend on the observed cost, the relationship
between the effort level and the output level is the same as in the case of complete
information.
The firm truthfully announces its efficiency (β = βˆ) if and only if:
βˆ ∈ arg max
β∈[β,β]
{
αg(β)− α
[
βˆ − e(β)
]
q(β) + δ [q(β)− qref ]− ψ [e(β)]
}
.
10The prospective payment system is used, in some countries, in contracts between governments
and hospitals for the provision of health care services. A fixed financing is attributed, based on the
Diagnosis-Related Group (DRG) of an hospital’s admission record, independently of the costs that
the hospital comes to incur in.
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The first order incentive compatibility constraint is:
V ′(βˆ) = −αq(βˆ). (25)
Integrating, we obtain:
V (βˆ) = V (β) +
∫ β
βˆ
αq(ξ) dξ. (26)
And the second order incentive constraint is:
q′(βˆ) ≤ 0. (27)
For the firm to participate, we must have V (βˆ) ≥ 0. Given (25), we can substitute it
for V (β) = 0.
6.2 The government’s optimization problem
The objective of the government is to maximize expected social welfare:
max
q(βˆ),e(βˆ)
∫ β
β
S
[
q(βˆ)
]
− (1 + λ)g(βˆ) + α
{
g(βˆ)−
[
βˆ − e(β)
]
q(β)
}
+
+δ
[
q(βˆ)− qref
]
− ψ
[
e(βˆ)
]
dβˆ (28)
subject to
V (β) = 0, (29)
V ′(βˆ) = −αq(βˆ), (25)
q′(βˆ) ≤ 0. (27)
We shall solve the following relaxed problem obtained by dropping (27) and then
check that the solution satisfies this constraint.
max
q(βˆ),e(βˆ),V (βˆ)
∫ β
β
S
[
q(βˆ)
]
− 1 + λ
α
{
V (βˆ)− δ
[
q(βˆ)− qref
]
+ ψ
[
e(βˆ)
]}
−
−(1 + λ)
[
βˆ − e(βˆ)
]
q(βˆ) + V (βˆ) dβˆ (30)
subject to
V (β) = 0, (29)
V ′(βˆ) = −αq(βˆ), (25)
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This is an optimal control problem with state variable V (βˆ) and control variables e(βˆ)
and q(βˆ). The first order conditions, written below, are obtained in Appendix D.1.
Proposition 5 (Government’s optimization problem - necessary conditions).
The following are necessary conditions for an interior optimum of problem (30):
V (β) = 0, (29)
V ′(βˆ) = −αq(βˆ), (25)
ψ′
[
e(βˆ)
]
= αq(βˆ), (24)
S ′
[
q(βˆ)
]
= (1 + λ)
[
2βˆ − β − e(βˆ)− δ
α
]
− α(βˆ − β). (31)
The first order conditions are sufficient under Assumption 1 (ii) (see Appendix D.1).
We can verify that the more efficient is the firm, the higher are the output and the
effort, by differentiating equations (31) and (24):{
S ′′q∗
′
p = (1 + λ)(2− e∗′p )− α
ψ′′e∗
′
p = αq
∗′
p
⇔
{
q∗
′
p = ψ
′′ 2+2λ−α
ψ′′S′′+α(1+λ)
e∗
′
p =
α(2+2λ−α)
ψ′′S′′+α(1+λ) .
We find that e∗
′
< 0 and q∗
′
< 0 which implies that (27) is verified. The solution of
the relaxed problem (30) is the solution of the fully constrained problem (28).
Proposition 6. Under Assumption 1, the firm’s output increases with its efficiency.
Therefore, the firm’s second order condition is satisfied, and the solution of the relaxed
problem (30) is the solution of the fully constrained (28) problem.
The equilibrium transfer is such that αt∗p(βˆ) = V
∗
p (βˆ) − δ
[
q∗p(β)− qref
]
+ ψ
[
e∗p(β)
]
and, given (26), we obtain:
t∗p(βˆ) =
1
α
{∫ β
βˆ
αq∗p(ξ) dξ − δ
[
q∗p(βˆ)− qref
]
+ ψ
[
e∗p(βˆ)
]}
.
As in the previous sections, for the numerical illustration, we assume that the social
value is S(q) = 2q − q2 and that the disutility of effort is ψ(e) = e2/2. Then (see
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Appendix D.1):
q∗p(βˆ) =
1
2− α(1 + λ)
[
2 + α(βˆ − β)
]
− 1 + λ
2− α(1 + λ)
(
2βˆ − β − δ
α
)
,
e∗p(βˆ) =
α
2− α(1 + λ)
[
2 + α(βˆ − β)
]
− α(1 + λ)
2− α(1 + λ)
(
2βˆ − β − δ
α
)
,
t∗p(βˆ) =
1
α
{∫ β
βˆ
αq∗p(ξ) dξ − δ
[
q∗p(βˆ)− qref
]
+
e∗p(βˆ)
2
2
}
.
Figure 7: Output with (δ = 0.05) and
without bureaucracy (δ = 0).
Figure 8: Social welfare with (δ = 0.05)
and without bureaucracy (δ = 0).
The firm tends to announce a low efficiency for the government to transfer a high
prospective payment. Bureaucratic behaviour counterbalances this tendency, allevi-
ating the problem of adverse selection.
In the general case, we find that the output and effort levels are increasing in δ (see
Appendix D.2, Lemma 10), and that the expected social welfare increases (decreases)
with the bureaucratic bias whenever the expected output level is larger (lower) than
the reference output, as in the previous cases (see Appendix D.2, Lemma 11).
7 Concluding remarks
We have studied procurement contracts between the government (principal) and a
bureaucratic firm (agent), in the presence of moral hazard and adverse selection.
Three different payment systems were considered: the optimal incentive scheme, cost
reimbursement and prospective payment. In any case, with a bureaucratic provider,
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we observe a higher level of public good provision. Under the prospective payment and
the optimal incentive schemes, the effort level is also higher. The optimal incentive
scheme is shown to remain linear in observed cost but to become more powered (the
firm supports a higher fraction of the costs) when the manager is more bureaucratic.
Finally we suggest that it is more interesting for the regulator to have large public
firms run by more bureaucratic managers and small ones run by less bureaucratic
managers.
The value of the manager’s marginal utility of output is, in the present model, known
by the regulator. It would be interesting to account for the fact that it is more likely
to be his/her private information and to analyze the resulting equilibrium in such a
framework. This will be the subject of further research.
A Appendix: Complete information
For the numerical illustration, we replace the social value by S(q) = 2q − q2 and the
disutility of effort by ψ(e) = e2/2 in problem (3):
max
q,e,U
{
2q − q2 − 1 + λ
α
[
U − δ(q − qref ) + e
2
2
+ α(βˆ − e)q
]
+ U
}
(32)
subject to
U ≥ 0.
With the participation condition being always binding, problem (32) becomes:
max
q,e
{
2q − q2 − (1 + λ)
[
− δ
α
(q − qref ) + e
2
2α
+ (βˆ − e)q
]}
. (33)
The first order conditions of problem (33) are:
∂f
∂q
= 0⇔ 2− 2q − (1 + λ)
(
− δ
α
+ βˆ − e
)
= 0, (34)
∂f
∂e
= 0⇔ − (1 + λ)
( e
α
− q
)
= 0. (35)
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From (34) and (35), we obtain:
q∗c =
1
2− α(1 + λ)
[
2− (1 + λ)
(
βˆ − δ
α
)]
,
e∗c = αq
∗
c ,
t∗c =
δ
α
(qref − q∗c ) +
e∗2c
2α
.
Assumption 1 guarantees that:
(i) the participation condition is always binding;
(ii) the second order conditions are satisfied.
(iii) the optimal output level is greater than zero.
(iv) the marginal cost is positive.
Assumption 1 is satisfied if we choose, for example, λ = 0.1, α = 1, δ = 0 or δ = 0.05,
β = 1.1, β = 1.3 and qref = 1.
B Appendix: The optimal incentive scheme
B.1 Problem of the firm - second order condition
The derivative of the value function with respect to βˆ is:
dV (βˆ)
dβˆ
=
∂U(β, βˆ)
∂β
dβ
dβˆ
+
∂U(β, βˆ)
∂βˆ
=
∂U(β, βˆ)
∂β
+
∂U(β, βˆ)
∂βˆ
. (36)
Differentiating (36) with respect to β we obtain:
0 =
∂2U(β, βˆ)
∂β2
+
∂2U(β, βˆ)
∂β∂βˆ
⇔ ∂
2U(β, βˆ)
∂β2
= −∂
2U(β, βˆ)
∂β∂βˆ
.
The local second order condition can, therefore, be written as:
∂2U(β, βˆ)
∂β∂βˆ
∣∣∣β=βˆ ≥ 0 for any βˆ.
Evaluating this second order derivative:
∂2U(β, βˆ)
∂β∂βˆ
= −ψ′′[e(β) + βˆ − β][e′(β)− 1].
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At the optimum:
∂2U(β, βˆ)
∂β∂βˆ
∣∣∣β=βˆ = −ψ′′[e(βˆ)][e′(βˆ)− 1].
Since ψ′′ > 0, the local second order condition becomes:
e′(βˆ) ≤ 1.
B.2 Differentiability of effort, transfer, and utility functions
The objective of this section is to prove Proposition 1 (i).
Lemma 1. β < βˆ ⇒ e(β, βˆ) ≥ e(βˆ, βˆ).
Proof.
From the incentive compatibility constraints, we know that:
αs(βˆ) + δ
[
q(βˆ)− qref
]
− ψ
[
e(βˆ, βˆ)
]
≥ αs(β) + δ [q(β)− qref ]− ψ
[
e(β, βˆ)
]
and
αs(β) + δ [q(β)− qref ]− ψ [e(β, β)] ≥ αs(βˆ) + δ
[
q(βˆ)− qref
]
− ψ
[
e(βˆ, β)
]
.
Adding the two inequalities, we obtain:
ψ
[
e(β, βˆ)
]
− ψ [e(β, β)] ≥ ψ
[
e(βˆ, βˆ)
]
− ψ
[
e(βˆ, β)
]
. (37)
Notice that, by definition:
e(β, βˆ)− e(β, β) = βˆ − β > 0
and
e(βˆ, βˆ)− e(βˆ, β) = βˆ − β > 0.
Since these differences coincide, strict convexity of ψ together with (37) implies that:
e(β, βˆ) ≥ e(βˆ, βˆ).
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Q.E.D.
Lemma 2. e(β, βˆ) is nonincreasing in β.
Proof.
Let β > β′ and define ∆(βˆ) ≡ e(β′, βˆ)− e(β, βˆ).
We want to prove that ∆(βˆ) ≥ 0.
Notice that: ∆(βˆ) = e(β′)− β′ − e(β) + β. Thus ∆(βˆ) does not depend on βˆ.
Then, ∆(βˆ) = ∆(β) = e(β′, β)− e(β, β).
By Lemma 1, ∆(β) ≥ 0.
Q.E.D.
Since the effort level is bounded, Lemma 2 implies that e(β, βˆ) is almost everywhere
differentiable in β. Therefore, e(β) = e(β, βˆ) + β − βˆ is also almost everywhere
differentiable in β.
Lemma 3. U(β, βˆ), as a function of β, is nondecreasing on
[
β, βˆ
]
and nonincreasing
on
[
βˆ, β
]
.
Proof.
Let us first show monotonicity on
[
β, βˆ
]
. Assume that β < β′ < βˆ and, by way of
contradiction, U(β, βˆ) > U(β′, βˆ). Thus:
αs(β) + δ [q(β)− qref ]− ψ
[
e(β, βˆ)
]
> αs(β′) + δ [q(β′)− qref ]− ψ
[
e(β′, βˆ)
]
.
On the other hand, we know that a firm with cost β′ prefers to announce β′ rather
than announce β. Thus:
αs(β′) + δ [q(β′)− qref ]− ψ [e(β′, β′)] ≥ αs(β) + δ [q(β)− qref ]− ψ [e(β, β′)] .
Adding the last two equations, we get:
ψ [e(β, β′)]− ψ [e(β′, β′)] > ψ
[
e(β, βˆ)
]
− ψ
[
e(β′, βˆ)
]
.
By definition:
e(β, β′)− e(β′, β′) = e(β, βˆ)− e(β′, βˆ).
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From Lemma 1, e(β, β′) ≥ e(β′, β′). Thus:
e(β, β′)− e(β′, β′) = e(β, βˆ)− e(β′, βˆ) > 0.
Again, by definition:
e(β, β′) < e(β, βˆ).
The last two equations, together with convexity of ψ, imply:
ψ [e(β, β′)]− ψ [e(β′, β′)] > ψ
[
e(β, βˆ)
]
− ψ
[
e(β′, βˆ)
]
.
Which is a contradiction.
Monotonicity on
[
βˆ, β¯
]
can be proved in the same way.
Q.E.D.
Lemma 4. αs(β) + δq(β) is nonincreasing.
Proof.
By definition:
U(β, β) = αs(β) + δ [q(β)− qref ]− ψ
[
e(β, β)
]⇔
⇔ αs(β) + δ [q(β)− qref ] = U(β, β) + ψ
[
e(β, β)
]
.
From Lemma 2: ψ
[
e(β, β)
]
is nonincreasing with β.
From Lemma 3: U(β, β) is nonincreasing with β.
Therefore, αs(β) + δq(β) must also be nonincreasing with β.
Q.E.D.
Lemmas 2 and 4 imply that the functions e(β, βˆ), e(β) and αs(β) + δq(β) are almost
everywhere differentiable. Hence U(β, βˆ) = αs(β) + δ [q(β)− qref ] − ψ
[
e(β, βˆ)
]
and
V (βˆ) = αs(βˆ) + δ
[
q(βˆ)− qref
]
− ψ
[
e(βˆ)
]
are also almost everywhere differentiable.
Q.E.D.
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B.3 The local second order condition implies the global one
Below, we prove Proposition 1 (iii).
Lemma 5. If ∂U/∂β is (strictly) monotonic in βˆ, then the local second order condition
implies the global one.
Proof.
The local second order condition implies that announcing the truth β = βˆ gives a
local maximum for the firm of type βˆ. Is there another announcement, β 6= βˆ, that
satisfies the first order condition? That is, does there exist β 6= βˆ such that:
∂U(β, βˆ)
∂β
=
∂U(βˆ, βˆ)
∂β
= 0?
This would imply that
∂U
∂β
(β, βˆ) =
∂U
∂β
(β, β) = 0.
But this is inconsistent with the strict monotonicity of ∂U/∂β with respect to its
second argument.
Q.E.D.
Lemma 6. If the local second order condition is (strictly) satisfied, then ∂2U/∂β∂βˆ
is (strictly) positive.
Proof.
Recall that:
U(β, β) = αs(β) + δ [q(β)− qref ]− ψ
[
e(β, β)
]
.
The partial derivative with respect to β yields an expression that we, then, differentiate
with respect to βˆ, to obtain:
∂2U
∂β∂βˆ
= −ψ′′
[
e(β) + βˆ − β
]
[e′(β)− 1] .
Using the strict version of (10) and the strict convexity of ψ, we obtain ∂
2U
∂β∂βˆ
> 0.
Q.E.D.
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B.4 The study of the Hamiltonian
Government’s optimization problem - necessary conditions
Consider problem (13). The Hamiltonian is:
H = S
[
q(βˆ)
]
− 1+λ
α
{
V (βˆ)− δ
[
q(βˆ)− qref
]
+ ψ [e(β)] + α
[
βˆ − e(βˆ)
]
q(βˆ)
}
+V (βˆ) + µ
{
−ψ′
[
e(βˆ)
]}
, (38)
where µ is the multiplier associated with (8). The Pontryagin principle11 yields:
∂H
∂q
= S ′
[
q(βˆ)
]
− (1 + λ)
[
βˆ − e(βˆ)− δ
α
]
= 0,
∂H
∂e
= −1 + λ
α
{
ψ′
[
e(βˆ)
]
− αq(βˆ)
}
− µψ′′
[
e(βˆ)
]
= 0, (39)
µ′(βˆ) = −∂H
∂V
=
1 + λ
α
− 1. (40)
Furthermore, β is a free boundary so that
µ(β) = 0. (41)
Integrating (40) and using (41), we obtain
µ(βˆ) =
(
1 + λ
α
− 1
)
(βˆ − β). (42)
Substituting in (39) above:
ψ′
[
e(βˆ)
]
= αq(βˆ)−
(
1− α
1 + λ
)
(βˆ − β)ψ′′
[
e(βˆ)
]
.
Government’s optimization problem - sufficient conditions
The second order derivatives of the Hamiltonian (38) are:
∂2H
∂q2
= S ′′
[
q(βˆ)
]
< 0,
∂2H
∂e2
= −1 + λ
α
ψ′′
[
e(βˆ)
]
+
(
1− α
1 + λ
)(
βˆ − β
)
ψ′′′
[
e(βˆ)
]
< 0,
∂2H
∂q∂e
=
∂2H
∂e∂q
= 1 + λ.
11See, for example, Chiang and Wainwright (2005).
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The determinant of the Hessian is:
|H| = S ′′
[
q(βˆ)
]{
−1+λ
α
ψ′′
[
e(βˆ)
]
+
(
1− α
1+λ
) (
βˆ − β
)
ψ′′′
[
e(βˆ)
]}
−
−(1 + λ)2 ≥ −S ′′
[
q(βˆ)
]
1+λ
α
ψ′′
[
e(βˆ)
]
− (1 + λ)2.
Using Assumption 1 (ii), we find that |H| > 0. Assumption 1 implies that the first
order conditions have a unique interior solution.
Finally, observe that the argument in Laffont and Tirole (1986, p.639) applies. Pon-
tryagin’s Principle requires V to be piecewise differentiable with a finite number of
pieces, while we only know that V is a.e. differentiable and decreasing. The space of
a.e. differentiable decreasing functions in [β, β] is a closed and convex subset of the
Banach space L∞([β, β], IR). Any decreasing function in [β, β] that is a.e. differen-
tiable can be approximated as closely as desired by a piecewise-continuous function.
Therefore, the maximum in the subspace of piecewise-continuous functions (the solu-
tion that we found above) is the maximum in the general space of a.e. differentiable
functions (the solution of the general problem).
Optimal incentive scheme - numerical example
Consider problem (13), and replace the social value by S(q) = 2q−q2 and the disutility
of effort by ψ(e) = e2/2. The Hamiltonian becomes:
H = 2q(βˆ)− q(βˆ)2 − 1 + λ
α
{
V (βˆ)− δ
[
q(βˆ)− qref
]
+
e(βˆ)2
2
+
1
α
[
βˆ − e(βˆ)
]
q(βˆ)
}
+
+ V (βˆ)− µe(βˆ).
The Pontryagin principle yields:
∂H
∂q
= 2− 2q(βˆ)− (1 + λ)
[
βˆ − e(βˆ)− δ
α
]
= 0, (43)
∂H
∂e
= −(1 + λ)
[
e(βˆ)
α
− q(βˆ)
]
− µ = 0, (44)
µ′(β) = −∂H
∂V
=
1 + λ
α
− 1. (45)
Furthermore, β is a free boundary so that
µ(β) = 0. (46)
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Integrating (45) and using (46), we obtain
µ(βˆ) =
(
1 + λ
α
− 1
)
(βˆ − β). (47)
Replacing equation (47) into (44), we obtain:
e(βˆ) = αq(βˆ)−
(
1− α
1 + λ
)
(βˆ − β). (48)
Replacing equation (48) into (43), we find the level of output:
q∗(βˆ) =
2
2− α(1 + λ) −
1 + λ
2− α(1 + λ)
[
βˆ − δ
α
+
(
1− α
1 + λ
)
(βˆ − β)
]
. (49)
Replacing equation (49) into (48), we obtain the level of effort:
e∗(βˆ) =
2α
2− α(1 + λ) −
α(1 + λ)
2− α(1 + λ)
[
βˆ − δ
α
+
(
1− α
1 + λ
)
(βˆ − β)
]
−
−
[
1− α
1 + λ
]
(βˆ − β).
The net transfer can be calculated from:
t∗(βˆ) =
1
α
{∫ β
βˆ
e∗(γ)dγ − δ
[
q∗(βˆ)− qref
]
+
e∗(βˆ)2
2
}
.
B.5 Nonlinearity and cost disturbances
Let us show that a scheme that is not linear in cost cannot implement the optimal
solution for all probability distributions of the cost disturbance.
We know that t(β, C) must satisfy:
s∗(β) = Et {β, [β − e∗(β)]q∗(β) + } .
If t is not linear in cost, there exist β, C1, C2 and C3 such that
t(β, C1)− t(β, C2)
C1 − C2 6=
t(β, C1)− t(β, C3)
C1 − C3 .
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Define i ≡ Ci − [β − e∗(β)]q∗(β), and consider the family of discrete distributions
with three atoms at e1, e2 and e3 and no weight elsewhere (since these distributions
can be approximated by continuous distributions, we could actually restrict ourselves
to continuous distributions). It is clear that by varying the weights on the three
disturbance levels and given the last equation, the first equation cannot always be
satisfied.
B.6 Effect of the bureaucratic bias
Lemma 7. q∗(βˆ) and e∗(βˆ) are increasing in δ.
Proof.
Differentiating equations (15) and (16), in order to δ we obtain: S ′′
dq∗(βˆ)
dδ
= −(1 + λ)
(
de∗(βˆ)
dδ
+ 1
α
)
ψ′′ de
∗(βˆ)
dδ
= αdq
∗(βˆ)
dδ
− (1− α
1+λ
)
(βˆ − β)ψ′′′ de∗(βˆ)
dδ
⇔
⇔

dq∗(βˆ)
dδ
= −1+λ
S′′
(
de∗(βˆ)
dδ
+ 1
α
)
de∗(βˆ)
dδ
=
− 1+λ
S′′
ψ′′+α(1+λ)
S′′ +(1− α1+λ)(βˆ−β)ψ′′′
⇔
⇔

dq∗(βˆ)
dδ
= 1+λ
S′′
[
1+λ
ψ′′S′′+α(1+λ)+S′′(1− α1+λ)(βˆ−β)ψ′′′
− 1
α
]
de∗(βˆ)
dδ
= − 1+λ
ψ′′S′′+α(1+λ)+S′′(1− α1+λ)(βˆ−β)ψ′′′
.
Using Assumption 1 (i) and (ii), we find that de
∗(βˆ)
dδ
> 0 and dq
∗(βˆ)
dδ
> 0.
Q.E.D.
Lemma 8. The expected social welfare, W ∗, increases (decreases) with the bureau-
cratic bias, δ, whenever the expected output level is larger (lower) than the reference
output, qref .
Proof.
The expected social welfare function is given by:
W ∗ =
∫ β
β
S
[
q∗(βˆ)
]
− 1 + λ
α
{
−δ
[
q∗(βˆ)− qref
]
+ ψ
[
e∗(βˆ)
]
+ α
[
βˆ − e∗(βˆ)
]
q∗(βˆ)
}
+
+
(
1− 1 + λ
α
)
V ∗(βˆ) dβˆ.
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It can be written as:
W ∗ =
∫ β
β
S
[
q∗(βˆ)
]
− 1 + λ
α
{
−δ
[
q∗(βˆ)− qref
]
+ ψ
[
e∗(βˆ)
]
+ α
[
βˆ − e∗(βˆ)
]
q∗(βˆ)
}
+
+
(
1− 1 + λ
α
){
V ∗(β)−
∫ βˆ
β
ψ′ [e∗(γ)] dγ
}
dβˆ.
Using the Envelope Theorem we find:
dW ∗
dδ
=
1 + λ
α
{∫ β
β
q∗(βˆ)dβˆ − qref (β − β)
}
=
1 + λ
α
{
Eβˆ
[
q∗(βˆ)
]
− qref
}
.
Q.E.D.
Lemma 9. For small enough ψ′′′, the fraction of cost that is supported by the firm,
K∗, is increasing with δ. That is: dK
∗(βˆ)
dδ
> 0.
Proof.
We know that both e∗(βˆ) and q∗(βˆ) are increasing in δ. Using equation (16) we can
rewrite (17) as:
K∗(βˆ) = 1−
(
1− α
1+λ
)
(βˆ − β)ψ′′
[
e∗(βˆ)
]
αq∗(βˆ)
.
Therefore:
dK∗(βˆ)
dδ
= −
(
1− α
1+λ
)
α
(βˆ − β)
ψ′′′
[
e∗(βˆ)
]
de∗(βˆ)
dδ
q∗(βˆ)− dq∗(βˆ)
dδ
ψ′′
[
e∗(βˆ)
]
q∗(βˆ)2
.
Thus, dK
∗(βˆ)
dδ
> 0 if and only if:
ψ′′′
[
e∗(βˆ)
] de∗(βˆ)
dδ
q∗(βˆ)− dq
∗(βˆ)
dδ
ψ′′
[
e∗(βˆ)
]
< 0⇔
dq∗(βˆ)
dδ
de∗(βˆ)
dδ
>
ψ′′′
[
e∗(βˆ)
]
q∗(βˆ)
ψ′′
[
e∗(βˆ)
] .
From the expressions for dq
∗(βˆ)
dδ
and de
∗(βˆ)
dδ
in Lemma 7, the condition above is al-
ways true when ψ′′′ is null. Therefore, we may conclude that, in this case, K∗(βˆ) is
increasing in δ for any value of βˆ.
Q.E.D.
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C Appendix: The reimbursement payment system
Replacing S
[
q(βˆ)
]
= 2q(βˆ)− q(βˆ)2 and t(βˆ) = − δ
α
[
q(βˆ)− qref
]
in problem (23):
max
q(βˆ),t(βˆ)
∫ β
β
2q(βˆ)− q(βˆ)2 − (1 + λ)
{
βˆq(βˆ)− δ
α
[
q(βˆ)− qref
]}
dβˆ. (50)
The first order condition of problem (50) is:
2− 2q(βˆ) = (1 + λ)
(
βˆ − δ
α
)
.
Simplifying, we get the output:
q∗r(βˆ) = 1−
1 + λ
2
(
βˆ − δ
α
)
.
The net transfer is:
t∗r(βˆ) = −
δ
α
[
1− 1 + λ
2
(
βˆ − δ
α
)
− qref
]
.
The second order condition of problem (50) is satisfied:
∂2f
∂q2
< 0⇔ −2 < 0.
D Appendix: The prospective payment system
D.1 The study of the Hamiltonian
Government’s optimization problem - necessary conditions
Consider problem (30). The Hamiltonian is:
H = S
[
q(βˆ)
]
− 1+λ
α
{
V (βˆ)− δ
[
q(βˆ)− qref
]
+ ψ [e(β)] + α
[
βˆ − e(βˆ)
]
q(βˆ)
}
+
+ V (βˆ) + ν
[
−αq(βˆ)
]
, (51)
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where ν is the multiplier associated with (25). The Pontryagin principle yields:
∂H
∂q
= S ′
[
q(βˆ)
]
− (1 + λ)
[
βˆ − e(βˆ)− δ
α
]
− να = 0, (52)
∂H
∂e
= −1 + λ
α
{
ψ′
[
e(βˆ)
]
− αq(βˆ)
}
= 0,
ν ′(βˆ) = −∂H
∂V
=
1 + λ
α
− 1. (53)
Furthermore, β is a free boundary so that
ν(β) = 0. (54)
Integrating (53) and using (54), we obtain
ν(βˆ) =
(
1 + λ
α
− 1
)
(βˆ − β). (55)
Substituting in (52) above:
S ′
[
q(βˆ)
]
= (1 + λ)
[
2βˆ − β − e(βˆ)− δ
α
]
− α(βˆ − β).
Government’s optimization problem - sufficiency conditions
The second order derivatives of the Hamiltonian (51) are:
∂2H
∂q2
= S ′′
[
q(βˆ)
]
< 0,
∂2H
∂e2
= −1 + λ
α
ψ′′
[
e(βˆ)
]
< 0,
∂2H
∂q∂e
=
∂2H
∂e∂q
= 1 + λ.
The determinant of the Hessian is:
|H| = −1 + λ
α
S ′′
[
q(βˆ)
]
ψ′′
[
e(βˆ)
]
− (1 + λ)2.
|H| > 0⇔ S ′′
[
q(βˆ)
]
ψ′′
[
e(βˆ)
]
> α(1 + λ).
We find that |H| > 0, by Assumption 1 (ii).
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Prospective payment system - numerical example
In problem (30), replace the social value by S(q) = 2q− q2 and the disutility of effort
by ψ(e) = e2/2. The Hamiltonian becomes:
H = 2q(βˆ)− q(βˆ)2 − (1 + λ)
{
V (βˆ)
α
− δ
α
[
q(βˆ)− qref
]
+
e(βˆ)2
2α
+
[
βˆ − e(βˆ)
]
q(βˆ)
}
+ V (βˆ)− ναq(βˆ),
where ν is the multiplier associated with (25). The Pontryagin Principle yields:
∂H
∂q
= 2− 2q(βˆ)− (1 + λ)
[
βˆ − e(βˆ)− δ
α
]
− να = 0, (56)
∂H
∂e
= −(1 + λ)
[
e(βˆ)
α
− q(βˆ)
]
= 0⇔ e(βˆ) = αq(βˆ), (57)
ν ′(β) = −∂H
∂V
=
1 + λ
α
− 1. (58)
Furthermore, β is a free boundary so that
ν(β) = 0. (59)
Integrating (58) and using (59), we obtain:
ν(βˆ) =
(
1 + λ
α
− 1
)
(βˆ − β). (60)
Replacing equation (60) in equation (56) we obtain:
2− 2q(βˆ) = (1 + λ)
[
βˆ − e(βˆ)− δ
α
]
+ α
(
1 + λ
α
− 1
)
(βˆ − β). (61)
Replacing the equation (57) into the equation (61) we obtain the level of output:
q∗p(βˆ) =
1
2− α(1 + λ)
[
2 + α(βˆ − β)
]
− 1 + λ
2− α(1 + λ)
(
2βˆ − β − δ
α
)
. (62)
Replacing the equation (62) into the equation (57) we obtain the level of effort:
e∗p(βˆ) =
α
2− α(1 + λ)
[
2 + α(βˆ − β)
]
− α(1 + λ)
2− α(1 + λ)
(
2βˆ − β − δ
α
)
.
The net transfer is:
t∗p(βˆ) =
1
α
{∫ β
βˆ
αq∗p(ξ) dξ − δ
[
q∗p(βˆ)− qref
]
+
e∗2p (βˆ)
2
}
.
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D.2 Effect of the bureaucratic bias
Lemma 10. q∗p(βˆ) and e
∗
p(βˆ) are increasing in δ.
Proof.
Differentiating equations (31) and (24), in order to δ we obtain: S ′′
dq∗p(βˆ)
dδ
= −(1 + λ)
(
de∗p(βˆ)
dδ
+ 1
α
)
ψ′′ de
∗
p(βˆ)
dδ
= α
dq∗p(βˆ)
dδ
⇔

de∗p(βˆ)
dδ
= − 1+λ
ψ′′S′′+α(1+λ) ,
dq∗p(βˆ)
dδ
= −1+λ
S′′ (
de∗p(βˆ)
dδ
+ 1
α
).
Using Assumption 1 (i) and (ii), we find that
dq∗p(βˆ)
dδ
> 0 and
de∗p(βˆ)
dδ
> 0.
Q.E.D.
Lemma 11. The expected social welfare, W ∗p , increases (decreases) with the bureau-
cratic bias, δ, whenever the expected output level is larger (lower) than the reference
output, qref .
Proof.
The expected social welfare function can be written as:
W ∗p =
∫ β
β
S
[
q∗p(βˆ)
]
− 1 + λ
α
{
ψ
[
e∗p(βˆ)
]
− δ
[
q∗p(βˆ)− qref
]}
−
−(1 + λ)
[
βˆ − e∗p(βˆ)
]
q∗p(βˆ) +
(
1− 1 + λ
α
)[
V ∗p (β)−
∫ βˆ
β
αq∗p(βˆ)
]
dβˆ.
Using the Envelope Theorem we find:
dW ∗p
dδ
=
1 + λ
α
{∫ β
β
q∗p(βˆ)dβˆ − qref (β − β)
}
=
1 + λ
α
{
Eβˆ
[
q∗p(βˆ)
]
− qref
}
.
Q.E.D.
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